Today, Ukraine is the object of intense attention by the international community regarding its new foreign policy guidelines. The statements by representatives of the new leadership team and the «decoding» of these allows us to form conclusions about the main vectors and specific steps in foreign and internal policy. These statements can be particularly revealing in the area of security. In the President’s statement on the occasion of the 18th anniversary of the Security Service of Ukraine, we heard: «Today, Ukraine cannot choose to enter either of the systems of collective security». In his opinion, the choice of Ukraine must be «maximally close collaboration without integration». In principle, if «today» is the keyword here, and if Euro-Atlantic integration but not a purely national approach to security is the ultimate goal, it is impossible to disagree with this assertion. Firstly, the pace of «Europeanisation» inside the Ukrainian house is unsatisfactory. Secondly, the Euro-Atlantic claims of Ukraine provoke negative reactions inside Russia. Thirdly, the West has grown tired of claims that are not supported by results. In these conditions it is unreasonable to continue to irritate neighbours and Ukrainian society with highly sensitive/controversial foreign policy objectives. In this circumstances, it would be more justified to take a short «time-out» and, during this period, concentrate on stabilising the internal situation. But what then? The words about the new security architecture in Europe in which the «participation not only of EU countries but also neighbours and partners of EU, in particular, Ukraine, Russia, Belarus, Moldova must be ensured», make the President’s position more clear. Are there any doubts that the keyword here is «Russia»? Probably, the President is trying to hide his actual intentions behind these diffuse phrases in order to avoid, at least for the moment, verbal attacks by the opposition and external pressure from Western ’strategic partners’. On the other hand, the representatives of his governmental team were less diplomatic and their statements have «compensated» for the more elusive formulations of the politically correct President. The statement of the Minister of Foreign Affairs about the necessity of establishing the non-aligned status of Ukraine at the legislative level (in accordance with the terms of the coalition agreement between the «Stability and Reforms» factions) testifies to the intentions of abandoning the Euro-Atlantic vector not only today, but forever. This is borne out by the statements of Deputy Prime Minister Volodymyr Semynozhenko on the ‘Shuster Live’ TV programme. In his opinion, a union of Ukraine, Russia and Belarus should be considered as an alternative to membership in the EU. Bearing in mind the utterance of Dmytro Tabachnyk and other representatives of the new team, this idea not only constitutes a pre-election platform, but a practical guide to action. In view of such statements, it would be desirable to assess whether non-aligned status and «maximally close collaboration without integration» can adequately substitute for Ukraine’s possible membership in the Euro-Atlantic system of collective security and whether union with Russia can substitute for membership in the EU. It should be noted that the experience of neutral Austria, Finland, Switzerland and Sweden (to which the adherents of Ukrainian neutrality often refer) do not provide grounds for an affirmative answer, as these countries find themselves in relatively stable and safe surroundings (except perhaps, Finland, thanks to its border with Russia), they are effectively integrated into NATO de facto and are capable of integrating with it in practice. But how can Ukraine, having divested itself of nuclear weapons and weakened its Armed Forces, being surrounded by hot spots and «frozen» conflicts, and threatened by internal political instability, be said to have an adequate national security system, let alone be deemed ready (?) to waive voluntarily (!) its prospects of NATO membership? If union with Russia and membership in the CSTO are examined as alternatives to the Euro-integration of Ukraine, first of all the motives for these projects should be taken into consideration. Russia’s motives are clear: to secure its southern frontiers, to preserve or revive spheres of influence and to dominate the post-Soviet and ‘Eurasian space’. The objectives of other countries have a subordinate character: to enlist Russia’s support in preventing and countering existing and potential threats-and also to secure economic preferences (in accordance with each country’s particular requirements, especially with regard to the technical modernization of national armed forces. Nevertheless, such expectations are not always borne out in practice. As a rule, Russia’s military presence leads to the «freezing», rather than the settlement of conflicts. Attempts to strengthen military and political collaboration by means of customs, economic and currency unions confront barriers erected by national egotism. Military and technical collaboration has resulted in deliveries by Russia of out-of-date and often technically useless Soviet-vintage armaments. As a result, most members of the CSTO have embarked on an expansion of partnership with NATO countries on a bilateral basis. Thereby Ukraine, in this sense, is a not a unique «irritant» for Russia, as certain pseudo-patriots try to portray it. In these conditions, the supposedly non-aligned status of Ukraine-in practice, Ukraine’s movement towards union with Russia-would indeed facilitate a certain reduction of tensions in the Ukrainian-Russian relationship. It meets the interests of Ukraine in tactical terms. But what about strategic terms? Taking into account such criteria as living standards, pace of development, human rights and freedoms, the Euro-Atlantic vector means for Ukraine «forward to Europe» and the Russian vector «back to the Soviet Union». Moreover, lest somebody fear that membership in NATO might result in the potential spread of terrorism to Ukraine, Russia’s vulnerability to terrorism has already brought this danger to Ukraine’s doorstep, and a union could only amplify the resonance of future terrorist acts on Russian territory. The new European security architecture is not in prospect tomorrow. And this process is hindered in particular by divergences in the policies of leading European countries towards Russia, and the absence of credible «Ukrainian initiatives» towards this end. Given these realities, a decided movement of Ukraine towards Russia would substantially increase the weight of the Russian factor in Europe, complicate and retard the process of European transformation, affording Russia time and untying its hands to ‘deal with’ Ukraine and erode its independence. Definite security safeguards would not be secured by non-alignment, but only by the status of permanent neutrality, which requires formal agreement by relevant international actors and which is therefore problematic. Even so, permanent neutrality relates only to military security and provides no additional guarantees against political or economic pressure (as the experience of neutral Turkmenistan indicates). In addition, military security must be supported by effective armed forces, a robust mobilization system (in particular, by an increase in the army’s overall strength, the modernisation of the recruiting system and an increase in the term of military service at least to two years). Military security also presupposes adequate defence expenditure: by a factor of five times (if we take Turkmenistan as the basis of comparison). There are very remote prospects too. Information for Turkmenistan
Area: 488 thousands km2.
Length of land border: 3,736 km, coastline—1,768 km
Population: 4.9 mln.
System of manning/recruiting: conscription.
Terms of military service: 24 months; for individuals with higher education—18 months; for naval and coast guard—30 months
GDP (2008, by parity of purchasing power): $ 29.65 bln.
Defence budget: 3.4% GDP.
The permanently neutral status of Turkmenistan was approved at a summit of member states of the Organization of Economic Cooperation (Islamabad), March, 15 of 1995; by the Non-aligned Movement with the participation of 114 countries (Kartakhen), October, 20 of 1995 and by UN General Assembly Resolution ¹50/80, December, 12 of 1995. The new authorities’ hasty statements-devoid of action plans beyond securing power and creating a new ‘vertical of authority’-underscore the lack of realism behind their intention of securing national security at the expense of Ukraine’s Euro-Atlantic integration. Direct and frank answers to questions about the goals of this new course can only be heard from radical political forces in Russia and Russophiles in Ukraine, who begrudge the independence of Ukraine. The test of the new authorities’ loyalty to Ukraine will be their stance on gas negotiations and the privatization of the country’s strategically important economic assets. Staking a bet on diminishing gas prices, the authorities have already made concessions on the question of Russian language, co-ownership of Ukraine’s gas pipeline, the permanent deployment in Crimea of Russia’s Black Sea Fleet. Possibly, Russia already has pocketed these concessions and is preparing for more. A further diminution of gas prices would most likely depend on Ukraine’s entry into the Custom’s Union, measures to facilitate the expansion of Russian business in Ukraine, not least through the privatisation processes. Taking into account the scale of Russian capital expansion by open or indirect acquisition of Ukrainian assets, Russia will legitimise its economic absorption of the most attractive ‘morsels’ of Ukraine (why make war on Ukraine, if it can be purchased?). The rest of Ukraine-and this would certainly suit both Russia and the more radical members of Ukraine’s new leadership-will be redesigned ‘Galicia’. Possibly, Ukraine’s newly enlightened strategists just don’t see the potential consequences of the emerging situation: the appearance of new dividing lines, new conflicts in society, rising crime, growing political risks for business, and the further marginalization of the country? Or perhaps these matters are too lofty for the country’s new beacons of light and ‘privatizers’? Thus already arises the question : who exactly did we elect? By the way, do the devotees of Russia in Europe see these consequences? Needless to say, all of them will unfold on the borders of the EU. |
